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Effective translations between numerical and verbal representations of uncertainty are a
concern shared by researchers in cognitive science and psychology, with applications to
real-world risk management and decision support systems. While there is a substantial
literature on such translations for point-wise probabilities, this paper contributes to the
scanty literature on imprecise probability translations. Reanalysis of Budescu et al.’s [1] data
on numerical interpretations of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [2] fourth
report’s verbal probability expressions (PEs) revealed that negative wording has deleterious
effects on lay judgments. Budescu et al. asked participants to interpret PEs in IPCC report
sentences, by asking them to provide lower, “best” and upper estimates of the probabilities
that they thought the authors intended. There were four experimental conditions, deter-
mining whether participants were given any numerical guidelines for translating the PEs
into numbers.
The first analysis focuses on 12 sentences in Budescu et al. that used the PE “very likely,”
“likely,” “unlikely,” or “very unlikely”. A mixed beta regression modelling the lower, “best”
and upper estimates revealed a less regressivemean and less dispersion for positive than for
negative wording in all three estimates, for both the “very likely” and “likely” sentence sets.
The Budescu et al. data also included a task asking for context-free translations of these PEs,
and a similar pattern of results was found for that task. Negative wording therefore resulted
in more regressive estimates and less consensus regardless of experimental condition.
The second analysis focuses on two statements that were positive–negative duals. Ap-
propriate pairs of responses were assessed for conjugacy and additivity. A large majority of
respondentswereappropriately super- andsub-additive in their lowerandupperprobability
estimates. Amixed beta regressionmodel of these three variables revealed that respondents
were suprisingly close to obeying the conjugacy relationships for lower and upper proba-
bilities.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Effective translations between numerical and verbal representations of uncertainty have proven to be elusive. Such
translations are sought after because they would have widespread applications for risk and uncertainty communicators and
managers, and risk management and decision support systems. Nevertheless, after nearly 50 years of effort they remain an
active research topic in cognitive science and psychology. One of themost common approaches to this kind of translation is a
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Table 1
IPCC probability phrase numerical guides.
Phrase IPCC range (%)
Virtually certain >99
Extremely likely >95
Very likely >90
Likely >66
More likely than not >50
About as likely as not 33–66
Unlikely <33
Very unlikely <10
Extremely unlikely <5
Exceptionally unlikely <1
“dictionary” table identifying a phrase with a range of numerical probabilities, and this approach recently was implemented
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for purposes of communicating scientific uncertainty to the lay
public.
The IPCC has provided reports that synthesize and assess information regarding scientific understanding of climate
change phenomena and their potential impact. The fourth IPCC report [2] utilizes verbal phrases to describe the uncertainties
affiliated with its major claims. These phrases include positively- and negatively-worded probabilistic expressions (PEs, e.g.,
“very likely” and “very unlikely”). The guidelines for the IPCC fourth report provided its authors a numerical translation of
the seven PEs they recommended for use in the report (Table 1). The first five entries in Table 1 are positive PEs, and the last
four are negative PEs. These guidelines also are included in the assessments and executive summaries.
Budescu et al. [1] conducted an experimental study of lay interpretations of these PEs, using 13 relevant sentences from
the IPCC report. Three sentences contained the PE “very likely,” three others had “likely,” three more had “more likely than
not,” three had “unlikely,” and three used “very unlikely.” To achieve this balance, they altered 4 sentences (8, 9, 10, and
12 in the list) suitably, replacing the terms “likely” and “very likely” with “unlikely” and “very unlikely,” respectively. The
sentences used in the Budescu et al. study are shown in the second Appendix.
Budescu asked 223 participants to interpret PEs in these sentences by providing estimates of the probabilities that
they thought the authors intended. Participants did so by using numerical sliders on a computer screen. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of four conditions:
• Control: No numerical guide to the PEs.
• Translation: Participants were shown the IPCC numerical translation guide to the PEs.
• Wide: Each sentence contained its appropriate IPCC numerical translation in the text (see Table 1).
• Narrow: Each sentence contained a numerical translation that was a sub-interval of the IPCC in the text. For “likely” and
“unlikely” the interval width was 10% and for “very likely” and “very unlikely” it was 5%.
They also asked the participants to judge the various PEs in a context free setting. The participantswere asked to provide four
estimates: Lower bound, lower best, upper best, and upper bound for every PE. They were first asked to provide the lowest
and highest probability that should be associated with each phrase. This was followed by a request to describe the “ideal”
probability represented by each phrase. Respondents were instructed that “this ideal can be a single probability (say 0.75) or
a range of probabilities (say, 0.72–0.79) which you consider to be perfectly matched with the phrase under consideration.”
Budescu et al. reported that participants’ “best” estimates were more regressive (toward the middle of the unit interval)
than the IPCC guidelines’ stipulations, although less so in the Narrow andWide conditions. The Narrow condition provided
the largest improvement in the quality of responses over the Control condition.
Budescu et al. ensured that four of their target sentences included negatively-worded PEs, but they did not assesswhether
the valence of the PEs had any effects on participants’ interpretations. Nevertheless, it is apparent from Figs. 2–4 in their
paper that the negatively-worded PEs yielded a greater spread of responses (i.e., less consensus) than the positively-worded
phrases, and the median responses were more regressive. Both possibilities are worthwhile evaluating because of their
implications for eliciting and communicating imprecise probability judgments.
Indeed there is empirical evidence that “positive” and “negative” PEs induce different actions and interpretations [3–8].
Teigen and Brun hypothesized, and offered good evidence, that positively framed PEs (e.g., likely) cause people to focus
attention on reasons supporting the occurrence of an event and negatively framed PEs (e.g., not likely) induce a tendency to
focus on the reasons for the nonoccurrence of an event. Teigen and Brun show that most PEs are unidirectional and that the
set of positive PEs is larger, and covers more of the probability scale, than the set of negative PEs. They stress the pragmatic
component of these phrases and suggest that the choice of PEs with a specific directionality allows for communication on a
more abstract level than bymeans of numerical probabilities. Teigen and Brun [5] also find that, everything else being equal,
the choice of positive or negative PEs can influence perceptions of correctness of the forecasts, surprise upon learning the
outcome of events, and decisions based on these communications. Budescu et al. [3] show that representations of PEs by
their membership functions are related to their semantic properties. More specifically, they demonstrate that the location
of the peak of a term’s membership function and its skew can effectively predict the PEs directionality.
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Fig. 1. Boxplots of estimates for six “very (un)likely” questions.
These empirical results highlight the importance of the PEs’ directionality andmotivate our re-analyses along these lines.
Wemodel the lower (P(A)), best (P(A)), and upper (P(A)) probabilities simultaneously, via amixed GLM for beta-distributed
random variables [9,10]. A description of and rationale for this model are given in the Appendix, along with explanations
of its parameters. We report four such modeling exercises, one each for the “very (un)likely” and “(un)likely” PEs and two
more for data from the same sample whowere asked to provide context-free numerical translations of “very (un)likely” and
“(un)likely.”
2. Positive versus negative wording effects
2.1. “Very likely” vs “very unlikely”
Responses to the three sentences using “very likely” and the three using “very unlikely” fromBudescu et al.weremodeled,
with responses to the “very unlikely” statements subtracted from1 to render themcomparable to those from the “very likely”
statements. Fig. 1 shows boxplots 1 of the resultant data. They indicate that there are differences in location and dispersion
between the positive and negative PEs, across the lower, best and upper estimates, and between experimental conditions.
We now describe the model of the effects shown in Table 2. The dependent vector consists of six sets of subvectors{
yij1, yij2, yij3
} = {P(A)ij, P(A)ij, P(A)ij}, for j = 1, . . . , 6. To respect the ordering yij1 ≤ yij2 ≤ yij3, we define xi2 = 1 for
yijk = yij2 oryijk = yij3 and0otherwise, and xi3 = 1 foryijk = yij3 and0otherwise.Wealso restrict the regression coefficients
for these dummy variables to be non-negative by exponentiating them. The “very likely” versus “very unlikely” predictor
is qi = 1 for “very likely” and 0 for “very unlikely”. The experimental condition predictors are ti1 = 1 for the Translation
condition, ti2 = 1 for the Narrow condition, ti3 = 1 for the Wide condition, and 0 otherwise. Using likelihood-ratio tests
and AIC as guides, the best model is
log
(
μijk
1 − μijk
)
= β0 + x2ieβ1+β2qi + x3ieβ3 + β4qi + β5t1i + β6t2i + β7t3i + bi, (1)
where bi ∼ N(0, e2u), and
log
(
φijk
) = δ0 + (δ1 + δ2qi) x2i + (δ3 + δ4qi) x3i + (δ5 + δ6t1i + δ7t2i + δ8t3i) qi + δ9t1i + δ10t2i + δ11t3i. (2)
The coefficients, standard errors and confidence intervals are shown in Table 2.
The location submodel’s β4 coefficient indicates that the positive statement probabilities were more extreme (less re-
gressive) than their negative statement counterparts. Thismodel’sβ2 coefficient also shows that this effect is boosted for the
“best” and upper estimates. Significant experimental condition effects are associated with the narrow and wide conditions.
1 The box plot summarizes a distribution via a display of five numbers. The black dot denotes the median, the upper and lower ends of the box identify the
upper (75%) and lower (25%) quartiles, and the dashed vertical lines locate the 10th and 90th percentiles.
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Table 2
Parameter estimates for “very likely” vs “very unlikely”.
95% Confid. Interval
Param. Estim. S.E. Lower Upper
Location Submodel
β0 −0.20 0.10 −0.39 −0.01
β1 −0.35 0.08 −0.51 −0.20
β2 0.47 0.09 0.30 0.65
β3 −0.16 0.05 −0.27 −0.05
β4 0.37 0.06 0.26 0.48
β5 0.11 0.12 −0.14 0.35
β6 0.77 0.14 0.49 1.04
β7 0.34 0.13 0.08 0.61
u −0.42 0.05 −0.52 −0.31
Precision Submodel
δ0 0.53 0.07 0.40 0.65
δ1 0.32 0.07 0.19 0.45
δ2 0.58 0.10 0.38 0.77
δ3 −0.01 0.07 −0.14 0.14
δ4 −0.27 0.10 −0.46 −0.09
δ5 0.09 0.09 −0.09 0.27
δ6 0.37 0.11 0.16 0.58
δ7 0.71 0.13 0.46 0.95
δ8 0.47 0.12 0.24 0.70
δ9 −0.19 0.07 −0.33 −0.04
δ10 0.46 0.09 0.29 0.63
δ11 0.26 0.08 0.10 0.43
In both of those conditions responses are more extreme than in the control condition, and of course this effect is greatest
for the narrow condition.
Theprecisionsubmodel is somewhatmorecomplex.Theδ1 coefficient indicatesgreaterprecision for the“best”probability
estimates than for the lower probability estimates, and δ2 suggests this is amplified for the positively-worded statements.
However, the negative δ4 coefficient suggests that this amplification does not hold for the upper estimates.
The positive–negative wording factor moderates the experimental conditions effects in the precision submodel. The
interaction effect coefficients δ7 and δ8 amplify the greater precision effects from the narrow and wide conditions for the
positively-worded sentences, while the δ6 coefficient negates the lower precision in the translation condition for negatively-
worded statements.
The model recovers the mean structure reasonably well. The largest inaccuracies are a tendency to under-estimate the
lower probability means, and themeans for the negative PEs tend to have larger errors (RMS error = 0.045) than the positive
PEs (RMS error = 0.029).
Participants were also asked to provide four estimates: Lower, lower best, upper best, and upper for each PE without
any context. These four variables were modeled using a mixed beta GLM in a similar fashion to that described above. The
best location submodel had a significant main effect showing that the negative and positive PEs did not differ in their
means (t(222) = −0.17, p = 0.86), contrary to the findings from the IPCC judgment task. The best precision submodel, on
the other hand, showed that the negative PEs yielded significantly less precise responses than the positive PEs (t(222) =
2.13, p = 0.03), in line with the previous findings although the effect is not as large.
2.2. “Likely” vs “unlikely”
We shall now examine the findings for the ratings of sentences containing the PEs “likely” or “unlikely.” As in Fig. 1, the
Fig. 2 boxplots indicate that there are differences in location and dispersion between the positive versus negative PEs, across
the lower, best and upper estimates, and between experimental conditions.
Using likelihood-ratio tests and AIC as guides, the best model is
log
(
μijk
1 − μijk
)
= β0 + x2ieβ1 + x3ieβ2 + β3qi + β4t1i + β5t2i + β6t3i + β7qit3i + bi, (3)
where bi ∼ N(0, e2u), and
log
(
φijk
) = δ0 + δ1x2i + δ2x3i + δ3qi + δ4qix3i + δ5t1i + δ6t2i + δ7t3i. (4)
The coefficients, standard errors and confidence intervals are shown in Table 3.
The location submodel’s β3 coefficient indicates that the positive statement probabilities were more extreme (less re-
gressive) than their negative statement counterparts. Significant experimental effects occur only in the narrow and wide
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Fig. 2. Boxplots of estimates for six “(un)likely” questions.
Table 3
Parameter estimates for “likely” vs “unlikely”.
95% Confid. Interval
Param. Estim. S.E. Lower Upper
Location Submodel
β0 −0.34 0.07 −0.48 −0.20
β1 −0.27 0.05 −0.36 −0.18
β2 −0.22 0.05 −0.31 −0.12
β3 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.17
β4 0.14 0.09 −0.04 0.31
β5 0.25 0.10 0.05 0.45
β6 0.39 0.11 0.19 0.60
β7 −0.24 0.07 −0.37 −0.12
u −0.76 0.06 −0.88 −0.65
Precision Submodel
δ0 0.65 0.05 0.54 0.75
δ1 0.44 0.05 0.34 0.54
δ2 −0.13 0.07 −0.27 0.00
δ3 0.47 0.05 0.36 0.57
δ4 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.24
δ5 0.34 0.06 0.22 0.46
δ6 0.62 0.06 0.50 0.74
δ7 −0.26 0.08 −0.43 −0.10
conditions. In both conditions responses are more extreme than in the control condition and this effect is greatest in the
narrow condition for the positive PEs. The negative β7 coefficient suggests that the narrow condition effect is negated for
the negative PEs.
Like the previous analysis, the current precision submodel’s δ1 coefficient indicates higher precision for the “best” and
“upper” probability estimates than for the lower probability estimates, although δ2 suggests slightly less precision for the
“upper” estimates. Importantly, the positive δ3 coefficient indicates higher precision for the positive PEs. The experimental
condition main effects are also in the expected direction, namely higher precision for the Translation, Narrow and Wide
conditions than for the Control condition. Finally, the negative δ7 coefficient suggests that the gain in precision for theWide
condition is smaller for negative than for positive PEs.
As in the preceding modeling exercise, this model recovers the mean structure fairly well. The means for the negative
PEs tend to have slightly larger errors (RMS error = 0.045) than the positive PEs (RMS error = 0.039).
Turning now to the context-free estimation task for the PEs “likely” and “unlikely,” the best location submodel had a
significant main effect for positive versus negative PE, and showed that the positive PEs means were slightly lower than the
negative PEs means (t(222) = −2.44, p = 0.02), contrary to the findings from the IPCC judgment task. The best precision
submodel, on the other hand, showed lower precision for the negative PEs than the positive PEs (t(222) = 3.05, p < 0.01),
in line with the previous findings although the effect is smaller.
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Fig. 3. Boxplots of sums.
3. Conjugacy
Two target sentences in [1] were positive–negative duals:
• Q1: It is very likely that hot extremes, heatwaves, and heavy precipitation eventswill continue to becomemore frequent.
• Q12: It is very unlikely that hot extremes, heat waves, and heavy precipitation events will not continue to become more
frequent.
This provides an opportunity to examine the relationships among subjective estimates of the lower and upper probabilities
of A and its complement Ac . Accordingly, this section assesses the responses to this pair of sentences for adherence to
superadditivity for lower probabilities, subadditivity for upper proabilities, and the conjugacy rule for lower and upper
probabilities.
Let Ac denote the complement of event A. The superadditivity requirement is P(A) + P(Ac) ≤ 1, and the subadditivity
requirement is P(A) + P(Ac) ≥ 1. A large majority (83.4%) of the respondents’ lower probabilities summed to less than 1,
and an even larger majority (97.8%) of respondents’ upper probabilities summed to more than 1.
Conjugacy is tested via the sums of appropriate pairs of responses, the criteria being
P(A) + P(Ac) = 1,
P(A) + P(Ac) = 1, and
P(A) + P(Ac) = 1.
Fig. 3 shows theboxplots for the three sumsand fourexperimental conditions. Themediansall arequite close to1 (conjugacy).
However, there appear to be main effects on dispersion both for experimental conditions and the sums.
To model the effects, for convenience the three sums described above were divded by 2, so that they lie in the unit
interval. The dependent vector
{
yij1, yij2, yij3
}
consists of the three sums in the order listed above, each divided by 2. We
define xi2 = 1 for yijk = yij2 and 0 otherwise, and xi3 = 1 for yijk = yij3 and 0 otherwise. The experimental condition
predictors are defined as before. In terms of likelihood-ratio tests and AIC the best model is
log
(
μijk
1 − μijk
)
= β0 + β1x2i + β2x3i + bi, (5)
where bi ∼ N(0, e2u), and
log
(
φijk
) = δ0 + δ1x2i + δ2x3i + δ3t1i + δ4t2i + δ5t3i. (6)
The coefficients, standard errors and confidence intervals are shown in Table 4.
The positive β0 coefficient plus positive β1 and β2 show that the closest adherence to conjugacy in the means occurs for
lower P(A) + P(Ac). β1 is largest so mean conjugacy is worst for P(A) + P(Ac). The large positive δ2 and moderate positive
δ1 coefficients show that the greatest precision occurs for P(A)+ P(Ac), followed by P(A)+ P(Ac). This result is being driven
by the imprecision in the P(Ac) estimates.
There are no significant experimental condition effects in the location submodel but there are in the precision submodel.
The positive δ4 and δ5 coefficients suggest that the narrow and wide conditions increase the precision of responses, the
narrow condition substantially so.
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Table 4
Conjugacy model parameter estimates.
95% Confid. Interval
Param. Estim. S.E. Lower Upper
Location Submodel
β0 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.25
β1 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.20
β2 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.12
u −0.39 0.06 −0.50 −0.28
Precision Submodel
δ0 2.40 0.17 2.07 2.74
δ1 0.38 0.19 0.01 0.76
δ2 1.15 0.26 0.64 1.66
δ3 0.30 0.18 −0.05 0.66
δ4 1.86 0.21 1.45 2.27
δ5 0.62 0.19 0.25 1.00
This model also captures the mean structure well. The location submodel is slightly upward-biased, with the model
estimates being about 0.02 higher than the observed values. However, this bias does not carry over into the differences
between the means, with estimates of those differences being very close to the sample differences.
4. Discussion and conclusions
In their summary and recommendations, Budescu et al. [1] concluded that access to the IPCC numerical translation table
reduced individual differences in the interpretation of PEs to some degree. Our reanalysis reinforces this claim and their
ensuing recommendation. Budescu et al. also observed that the variability in respondents’ estimates in all likelihood is
greater than the actual amount of disagreement among the scientists whose views are encompassed by the relevant PEs.
They based this assessment on their analysis of the “best” estimates. The reanalysis of the lower and upper probabilities in
this paper suggests that the picture is even worse than their summary suggested.
They note, for instance, that 25% of the subjects interpreted “very likely” as having a “best” probability below 70%. The
boxplots in Fig. 1 show that in three of the four experimental conditions at least 25% of the subjects provided a lower
probability of less than 50%. If we turn to “very unlikely” the picture is worse still. The Fig. 1 boxplots indicate that in three
of the four experimental conditions about 25% of the subjects returned an upper probability for “very unlikely” greater than
80%!
Our reanalysis provides additional insights. Chief among these is the apparently deleterious impact of negatively-worded
PEs on both the regressiveness of people’s intuitive numerical translations of these PEs and, more importantly, on the
consensus of such translations. Because beta GLMs are naturally heteroscedastic, it is possible to separate the effect of a shift
in the mean from the effect of a shift in precision on variance. In this setting that separation has important implications
regarding our assessment of the amount of variation across individuals in their intuitive numerical translations. More
regressive estimates (i.e., further away from 0 or 1) results in greater variability, but that is an artifact of a shift in the mean
response. Our results strongly suggest that negativelyworded PEs also increase variability inways not attributable to amean
shift. This pattern was replicated across two IPCC-sentence and two context-free translation tasks.
Two other important findings have emerged regarding precision. First, it is worst for the lower (upper) probability
estimates provided for “very likely” and “likely” (“very unlikely” and “unlikely”). But these are translations of the very
thresholds identified in the IPCC numerical guides, as shown in Table 1. The effect also was greater for the negative PEs.
Second, the Narrow and Wide conditions not only resulted in less regressive estimates (as Budescu et al. had originally
concluded) but they also yielded greater precision, i.e., greater consensus beyond that due to less regressive estimates.
The “pleasant surprise” in our analyses is the fairly strong adherence of subjective estimates to superadditivity, subaddi-
tivity, and the conjugacy rules. To our knowledge, only one other empirical assessment of adherence to conjugacy has been
reported (Example 2 in [11]). In our sample, the medians in all conditions and for all three sums deviated no more than 0.1
from conjugacy. A substantial majority of these sumswere within 0.2 of 1 (from 52% to 86%). Moreover, both sums involving
lower and upper probabilities were closer to conjugacy on average than P(A) + P(Ac), which of course is just binary com-
plementarity. This is striking because while many respondents would have been aware of the binary complementarity rule
for classical probabilities, it is very unlikely that they would know about conjugacy. This may be a rather unusual instance
where rational prescription coincides with human intuition. However, we urge caution in generalizing from these findings
because they are based on only one pair of sentences and the PEs tended to elicit extremal probabilities (which will adhere
closely to the conjugacy rules as an artifact of being close to 0 or 1).
At least four avenues of future research are indicated by our findings here. First, the negatively-worded sentences con-
tained a mixture of negatively-worded PEs and events (of the form “it is very unlikely that A will not occur”). Inspection
of the data suggested that at least some respondents may have found these double-negatives especially confusing. Thus,
the effect of negatively-worded PEs merits further investigation, most suitably via IPCC report sentences manipulated to
incorporate positive and negative wording for various PEs and events crossed in a factorial design, as exemplified in Table 5.
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Table 5
Factorial design.
Event Probability Phrase
A Likely that A Unlikely that A
Ac Likely that Ac Unlikely that Ac
It is possible that the greater variability and more regressive means identified with the negatively-worded IPCC sentences
are in good part due to double-negatives, but this cannot be determined via the study dealt with here.
Second, alternative numerical guides could be comparedwith one another. The IPCC guidelines specified only one bound,
leaving the other implicitly at either 0 or 1 as appropriate. For PEs conveying either very high or very low probabilities this
seems natural, but for a middling PE such as “likely” an interval from .66 to 1 seems counter-intuitive not only for its
width but also because it contains the prescribed interval for “very likely.” The IPCC guidelines notwithstanding, it would
be worthwhile to ascertain whether there is greater consensus in intuitive translations when the phrases refer to mutually
exclusive and non-overlapping intervals instead of nested ones. Likewise, guides that include prescribed “best” probabilities
could be compared with those containing only lower and upper values.
Third, Budescu et al. suggested several influences on people’s intuitive translations. For instance, those convinced about
climate change tended to give higher estimates for PEs referring to climate change events or consequences. It is plausible that
subjective probability judgments will be subject to motivated reasoning (Kunda, [12]). Recently Budescu, Por and Broomell
[13] have confirmed this with best estimates of PEs, but this has yet to be investigated with respect to lower and upper
bounds of such subjective imprecise probabilities.
Finally, there is the question of whether our effects hold up in different languages and cultures. The perceptions and
reactions to PEs are found to differ across individuals and contexts, with almost all research on PEs being conducted in the
United States and Western Europe. Differences in the applicability of certain PEs, as well as the perception of directionally
may vary across languages and cultures. Research currently under way will collect data on PEs in numerous countries that
will play a pivotal role in international climate change policy. The results could potentially allow for a more transparent
translation, and a deeper understanding of how different languages perceive and use the PEs.
Appendix: Beta GLMs
We begin by describing themixed GLM employed in this paper. Let y ∈ (0, 1) be distributed Beta(μφ, (1−μ)φ), where
μ = E(y) and φ is a precision parameter, such that Var(y) = μ(1 − μ)/(φ + 1) so φ = μ(1−μ)
Var(y)
− 1. As Smithson and
Verkuilen [9] argue, the Beta distribution is appropriate for modeling a random variable whose support is bounded at both
ends, as in this case where the support is the unit interval. While it is not the only such distribution, it is very flexible and
also has the attractive property of being parameterized in terms of a mean and a precision parameter. This characteristic
renders the Beta distribution especially suitable for modeling the mean response (location) and dispersion simultaneously.
For a two-level model let i = 1, . . . , I index subjects and j = 1, . . . , J index observations within the ith subject, so there
are IJ = N total observations. A mixed beta GLM contains four matrices of regressors, X, Z,V,W. X and V are associated
with the location and precision, respectively, so that xi, vi are their ith row vectors of full rank (Typically they have a column
vector 1 for an intercept). Z andW are the regressors for randomeffects b and d, respectively. Then the location and precision
submodels are
log
(
μij
1 − μij
)
= xijβ + zijb, (7)
log
(
φij
) = vijδ + wijd. (8)
In this paperwe restrict the random-effectsmodels to random-interceptmodels for the location submodelwith a normal
mixing distribution.
Estimation was by maximum likelihood using the NLMIXED package in SAS 9.2. Maximum likelihood methods enable
the use of both likelihood ratio tests for comparingmodels on the basis of goodness of fit, andWald t- or z-tests for assessing
the significance of individual coefficients in a model. The coefficients’ standard errors used in theWald tests also were used
in constructing the 95% confidence intervals for the coefficient estimates. These standard errors were estimated in the usual
fashion by inverting the Hessian matrix.
The location submodel coefficients in thismodel can be interpreted in a similarway to coefficients in a logistic regression,
because the logit link typically is used in both. A positive (negative) βj is the increase (decrease) in log(μij/(1 − μij)) per
unit increase (decrease) in its covariate xij , so e
βj can be interpreted as a multiplier of odds.
In the precision submodel, a positive (negative) δj coefficient is the increase (decrease) in log(φij) per unit increase
(decrease) in its covariate vij , so e
δj can be thought of as a multiplier of precision.
The variance of a Beta random variable is
σ 2 = μij(1 − μij)/(φij + 1),
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so the variance is influenced both by the mean and precision parameters. This simply reflects the fact that as the mean
approaches either 0 or 1, if the precision remains constant then the variance necessarily decreases. However, it is important
to bear in mind that modeling precision is not equivalent to modeling the variance. Consequently, interpreting the effect of
predictors on the variance may not be straightforward. A positive βj , for instance, increases variance if it is shiftingμij from
values below 0.5, but decreases variance if it is shifting μij from values above 0.5.
Appendix: Sentences Used in Budescu et al.
1. It is very likely that hot extremes, heat waves, and heavy precipitation events will continue to becomemore frequent.
2. Continued greenhouse gas emissions at or above current rateswould cause furtherwarming and inducemany changes
in the global climate system during the 21st century that would very likely be larger than those observed during the
20th century.
3. Average Northern Hemisphere temperatures during the second half of the 20th century were very likely higher than
during any other 50-year period in the last 500 years and likely the highest in at least the past 1300 years.
4. Global average sea level in the last interglacial period (about 125,000 years ago) was likely 4 to 6m higher than during
the 20th century, mainly due to the retreat of polar ice.
5. The Greenland ice sheet and other Arctic ice fields likely contributed no more than 4 m of the observed sea level rise.
6. Temperatures of the most extreme hot nights, cold nights and cold days are likely to have increased due to anthro-
pogenic forcing.
7. It is more likely than not that anthropogenic forcing has increased the risk of heat waves.
8. It is unlikely that there has not been significant anthropogenic warming over the past 50 years averaged over each
continent except Antarctica.
9. Based on a range ofmodels, it is unlikely that future tropical cyclones (typhoons and hurricanes)will not becomemore
intense, with larger peakwind speeds andmore heavy precipitation associatedwith ongoing increases of tropical SSTs
(sea surface temperatures).
10. Temperatures of the most extreme hot nights, cold nights and cold days are unlikely to have increased due to factors
other than anthropogenic forcing.
11. It is very unlikely that the MOC (the meridonial overturning circulation) will undergo a large abrupt transition during
the 21st century.
12. It is very unlikely that hot extremes, heat waves, and heavy precipitation events will not continue to become more
frequent.
13. It is very unlikely that climate changes of at least the seven centuries prior to 1950 were due to variability generated
within the climate system alone.
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